Cascadity Audio
← All streams

#certificates

Everything tagged certificates, across every stream.

0

Apple's command-line git, curl and python3 still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates, researchers warn

The page includes a one-line check (and a safe demo) to see if your Mac's git can be fooled; Apple's support note explains the manual fix.

Follow-up to last week's eMudhra breach, in which the private keys of eight of the Indian certificate authority's intermediate CAs were compromised. A community site run by Dennis Jackson says that as of October 28, the developer tools Apple ships with macOS, including git, curl and python3, still accept certificates from those CAs, 11 days after Apple was notified. It says macOS 27.2, released October 26, did not fix this and undid the manual workaround. Because anyone holding the keys can mint a certificate for any site, it argues that an attacker on the network path could intercept git clones and pushes or capture tokens; the page offers a test repository that impersonates GitHub.

Apple's support note says it has blocked the 12 affected certificates in Safari, Mail and apps using its networking frameworks since October 19, and the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 since October 23. It confirms that tools such as curl and git check /etc/ssl/cert.pem and can still accept these certificates until a future software update, and gives steps to remove the roots by hand.

On Hacker News, some argued the title should blame the shared certificate file rather than git, and one commenter said the threat is overblown because an attacker needs a network position first.

Rabbit Holes 2
0

r/cybersecurity: eight eMudhra TLS certificates found with private keys only a few bits long

Why a single weak certificate authority can matter to everyone, and the long cleanup ahead.

The post links Ars Technica's report that eight intermediate TLS certificates belonging to the India-based certificate authority eMudhra had private keys of only 3 to 8 bits (a normal P-384 key has about 384 bits), so anyone could use them to issue certificates that browsers and apps would trust for any site. Ars says browser makers and some major apps and programming languages had blocked all eight by Tuesday, with no sign yet of malicious use in certificate transparency logs, but cryptography engineer Filippo Valsorda called it "a massive cleanup job, bigger than Heartbleed," because of Linux distributions, containers and IoT devices. Exploiting it requires intercepting traffic.

Replies from defenders range from gallows humor about ruined evenings to disbelief at the key sizes. Others question why systems automatically trust so many certificate authorities, and note that the certificates had been cross-signed by Sectigo. About 3,100 upvotes in a 1.1-million-member community.

Rabbit Holes 2
0

Hackers got valid certificates for Google domains by hijacking three countries' registries

A clear walk-through of how controlling DNS can be enough to get a trusted certificate.

Attackers compromised third-party operators of the .GH (Ghana), .SL (Sierra Leone) and .AS (American Samoa) country-code domains, changed DNS records and obtained valid HTTPS certificates for domains they didn't own, including several Google domains, Google says. Google says its own systems were not compromised. It blocked the certificates in Chrome, worked to have them revoked, and found other organizations, including major brands, affected by the same attacks. Chrome users don't need to do anything; Google notes other browsers may not be protected.

Rabbit Holes 1