Cascadity Audio
← All streams

#supply-chain-attack

Everything tagged supply-chain-attack, across every stream.

0

Google takes down a 1.3-million-device TV-box botnet and bans the Chinese maker it says built the backdoor in

BleepingComputer details how the backdoor shipped in firmware and was rented out to residential-proxy and ad-fraud operators.

Google and partners including Japan's National Police Agency, Lumen, HUMAN Security, Plume, Synthient and TrendAI have disrupted XCPE, a botnet of more than 1.3 million Android TV boxes and other devices in over 200 countries. Google's Threat Intelligence Group says "with high confidence" that Shenzhen device maker Videostrong Technology built the backdoor into its firmware during manufacturing and sold access to criminal affiliates.

Those affiliates installed modules for ad fraud and residential-proxy services, which route other people's traffic through the owner's home connection, according to BleepingComputer. Google says it also took down command servers used by more than a dozen related malware families, cutting off at least 10 million more compromised devices, including set-top boxes, karaoke machines and telehealth hardware.

Google has cut ties with Videostrong and banned it and future affiliates from making certified Android devices. The Register notes Videostrong did not immediately respond, and that XCPE belongs to the same ecosystem as BadBox 2.0, disrupted in 2025.

Rabbit Holes 1
0

Backdoored copies of the Claude Code extension appear on Cursor's extension marketplace for about 11 hours

Cursor's notice has the timeline, checks and cleanup scripts; Phorion's analysis explains how the backdoor works and why a bug kept it from fully succeeding on Macs.

Cursor says that on October 29, between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. Pacific, its VS Code extension marketplace served maliciously modified versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of Anthropic's Claude Code extension for Windows and macOS, versions not made by Anthropic. The code ran as soon as the extension loaded: it sent host and user details to the attacker, added an attacker SSH key labeled "svc-telemetry" to the user's authorized keys, tried to enable SSH and open a reverse tunnel, and set up persistence. Cursor says errors in the malware meant the SSH step failed unless Cursor ran with admin rights. It pulled the versions, shut down and rebuilt the marketplace, rotated keys and had the attacker's server taken offline. Affected users should run its check, remove the key and persistence, and rotate credentials; uninstalling alone may not be enough.

The security firm Phorion, which also detected it, published a technical analysis, including the macOS permission-check mistake that skips turning on Remote Login.

Cascadic Analysis 1
UndertowPrivilege escalation + credential propagation

What hidden risk could pull against this, even if the news is good?

A coding-assistant extension runs with the developer's own account, files and network, so a fake version inherits all of it the moment it loads. This one sent host details, tried to add an attacker SSH key and open a reverse tunnel, and set up persistence that survives uninstalling. Cursor says the SSH step usually failed without admin rights, but it still tells users to rotate every credential and session reachable from an affected machine, because the backdoor could have been used to collect more.

0
Rabbit Holes 2
0

Hijacked LiteLLM release on PyPI and Docker planted a credential stealer and backdoor

SafeDep shows exactly how the malicious files got into the package; BleepingComputer lists the affected images and what to rotate.

Version 1.107.0 of LiteLLM, a popular open-source Python gateway for calling AI models, was published to PyPI and Docker registries with malware on October 21, according to SafeDep and BleepingComputer. LiteLLM confirmed the compromise and says the release pipeline was hijacked; SafeDep says LiteLLM believes the attacker took three developers' GitHub CLI credentials from the logs of an internet-exposed internal deployment.

All seven wheels for Linux, macOS and Windows added three files that run whenever Python starts, even if litellm is never imported. One steals SSH keys, cloud and CI/CD credentials, AI tool tokens, browser passwords and stored model-provider keys; another checks in hourly and downloads and runs more code. The PyPI release was live from 11:39 to 13:23 UTC; Docker Hub and GHCR tags pointed to bad images for a couple of hours. Versions 1.106.2 and the 1.107.0 release candidates are clean.

BleepingComputer says affected systems should be isolated and rebuilt and all exposed secrets rotated, and warns that running Python or pip to investigate also triggers the malware.

Cascadic Analysis 1
UndertowPrivilege escalation + credential propagation

What hidden risk could pull against this, even if the news is good?

SafeDep says LiteLLM believes the attacker started with three developers' GitHub CLI credentials, found in the logs of an internet-exposed internal deployment. Those let the attacker publish a release, and the release's job was to collect more credentials: SSH keys, cloud and CI/CD secrets, AI tool tokens and stored model-provider keys. Because LiteLLM is a gateway that sits in front of many model providers, the machines that run it tend to hold keys to all of them at once.

0
Rabbit Holes 2